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Preventing terrorism in the food industry
By Geni Wren  |  Friday, April 30, 2010

Agriculture and our food supply is not immune from terrorism, however, the good news is that the potential remains lower than one might think. History shows us that agricultural or food supply terrorism has traditionally not worked that well.

Speaking at the Animal Agriculture Alliance meeting in Arlington, Va., this week, Homeland Security Today editor David Silverberg described some early attempts at livestock and food supply terrorism that failed. For instance, during World War I, there was a determined effort by the Germans to kill their enemies’ horses and mules with anthrax and glanders in Romania, Spain, Norway, Argentina and the U.S. “It was one of the largest and well-organized animal sabotage attempts,” explained Silverberg (who showed a WWI photo of a horse wearing a gas mask),” but it just did not work very well.”

During WWII, Japan had an active biological program against the Soviet Union in Mongolia. He said that Japanese agents used anthrax and rinderpest and in 1931 tried to poison a League of Nations delegation with cholera-tainted fruit. That effort also failed.

More recently in 1979, the Arab Revolutionary Council poisoned Israeli oranges with mercury, disrupting Israeli trade. The problem with that tactic is that is damaged other countries’ trade. “It showed the unpredictability of agroterrorism,” Silverberg said. “They got everyone mad at them and did not achieved their larger political objective.”

Again in1989 some Chilean grapes were poisoned with cyanide and ended up at the port of Philadelphia. The U.S. and Canada recalled all Chilean fruit, costing Chile hundreds of millions of dollars and bankrupting over 100 Chilean growers. It was a tactic to get back at Pinochet’s dictatorship, but then it had unintended consequences because it was hard to control.

Though it seems like agricultural operations would be a prime target, Silverberg explained that agroterrorism does not usually fit in well with a terrorist’s objectives of a defined target (because agroterrorism is not immediate and targeted like an explosion, for instance) and perhaps our bigger threat is from within, such as disgruntled employees wanting to get back at an employer. "That type of person would know the industry, know the system, know the vulnerabilities and have some idea of the consequences at some level.”

That’s not say it couldn’t happen. “There is a lot of vulnerability in the agriculture industry,” Silverberg said. “There is a possibility that someone might do something that might harm the feed or the livestock and create an incident that would harm the industry. It’s something we need to keep in mind as we go about our business and look at our food supply. We need vigilance, basic precautions and being conscious of what’s going on around us; there are here are hazards and bad people out there.”

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